Morality as craft

What we call “morality” at one level would be called “craft” at the next level; and then, one level up, the “craft” again is associated with a (higher?) “morality,” which, again, is identical to a “craft” one level up and so on. And the purpose of this world, our “here”—elsewhere, there are technicians working on it, and when they do it well, we call it “good,” and when they are unable to accomplish what they are trying to accomplish, we call it “evil.” These technicians, however, have no stake in the goodness or evil of the world as such, and they would not call it that (but there are other things that they do call good or evil). But they still try their best, because for them, the world serves some other purpose, and in fact this purpose is what causes it to be good or evil from in here; it is how we know to help them do what they are trying to do.

This thought gets at its object in an especially oblique way; I don’t know if I know what I mean by it, although Plato in a number of places says something similar: that morality is very much like a craft, and someone who acts more ethically does so because they are more skilled at the craft. And the steersman we call “the Good,” and it is what binds together everything.